The Enbridge Pipeline’s questionable safety measures
When Michelle Barland Smith woke up one morning in July 2010 in Battlecreek, Michigan — a small town overlooking the Kalamazoo River — the first thing she noticed was an unusual odour in the air, something you might get from a mix of “gasoline, tar, and nail polish remover.” The next day a neighbour told her there had been an oil spill somewhere in the vicinity. Sure enough, when Michelle went out that evening to check on the cluster of emergency vehicles gathering on a nearby bridge, she could make out a sheen of oil on the river’s surface. There was confusion on the bridge: two men had capsized their canoe while trying to find out what was going on, and no one knew if they were safe or not. As it turned out, the canoeists were all right, but no one would find out “officially” that a major oil spill had occurred until they heard about it on CNN later that night.
As it transpired, Enbridge was responsible for the spill of almost a million gallons of oil. A few months ago, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) published an Accident Report itemizing the many failures that characterize Enbridge’s role in the accident. Yet Enbridge continues to maintain that it has both the competence and safety record to earn public trust.
The Accident Report was filed in October 2012 and found that Enbridge had failed in essential safety issues: pipeline construction, maintenance, control operations, response, and community awareness. Enbridge was found to have a “systemic” problem and was plagued by a “culture” of disregard for key issues. The report tells us that Enbridge employees displayed incompetence, not only in diagnosing a problem, but also in ignoring protocol. Their training proved to be grossly deficient; their resources were completely inadequate; sometimes they didn’t know what to do, or if they did, they didn’t act appropriately. Enbridge had known about the corrosion and “the 51.6 inch crack-like feature” that led to the rupture in Marshall for five years leading up to the spill, but hadn’t done anything about it.
Enbridge applied “a lower margin of safety” than was required, increasing the “inherent risks” of system failure, the report summarized.
When the rupture in the pipe occurred, a large gap opened up, six feet long and five inches wide. But when alarms went off in the control room, operators misread them, management in Chicago misread them, and orders were given to start pumping. They mistakenly thought that a big drop in pressure was due to “column separation,” or a “bubble,” that could be pumped through, so even when several hundred thousand gallons of oil escaped into a wetland, the operators were ordered to continue pumping.
The people of Marshall were calling 9-1-1 and complaining about the smell of oil. Yet no one knew where it was coming from, because the community had never been informed as to the whereabouts of the pipeline. When a town utilities man called Enbridge control directly and told them he could see oil on the ground, pumping finally stopped. The spill had gone undetected for 17 hours.
By this point, the spill had reached Talmadge Creek and a response crew — consisting of only four people and two trucks — was sent out. Even after locating the spill, the crew didn’t know how to proceed further: they applied improper retaining techniques, they didn’t know how to set up an underflow dam, and they couldn’t stop the oil from getting into the Kalamazoo River. It had been raining and the water was high, the oil was travelling far downstream. The spill was out of control and they needed more help, but help was hours, even days, away.
The spill proved to be a disaster. The community was evacuated, leaving many scared, upset, and dealing with health problems as a result. More than two years and almost a billion dollars later, they’re still cleaning up the mess. Bitumen oil is a hazardous, highly toxic material that sinks right to the bottom. Enbridge has been ordered to dredge the river bottom because bitumen doesn’t just go away; it permeates and contaminates the river sediment and the wetland mud.
The billion dollars for this clean-up is more than half of the projected revenue that BC could expect from the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline over the next 30 years.
That’s the cost of only one spill. Just two of these could wipe out any revenue gains and put taxpayers on the hook for a lot more money way into the future.
The Enbridge Joint Review Panel Review recently left Vancouver. So far, over a thousand residents from all over BC have taken the time to say “no” to the project. In his Feb. 22 campaign speech, Adrian Dix addressed a packed audience at the Burnaby Hilton and, acting on these concerns, he promised he would take the steps necessary to block the Northern Gateway Pipeline if elected premier.
The spill in Marshall was one of the largest inland spills ever recorded in the US Northwest. They were also responsible for spills of over a million gallons in Grand Rapids, Minnesota and in Pembina, North Dakota. Enbridge attributed the Marshall accident to “a series of unfortunate events” and to “circumstances” beyond their control. Wasn’t it enough that their employees were “trying to do the right thing?”
On their website, Enbridge claims to be a leader in the industry. Yes, they are a leader, but in disasters, not safety.
